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Enver H.oxha and the turning points In Albania's history 
Albania has rarely been among the front page news in the 
world press. But the death of Enver Hoxha at the age of 77, 
on 11 April 1985, was a leading article of every news agency. 
Hoxha had been at the head of the Party of Labour of Albania 
since 1941. His activity can be and will be evaluated in 
several different ways, but it is certain thet this uniquely 
long leadership, that lasted for more than four decades, had 
an epoch-marking role in the life of this small Balkan 
country. ' 
Enver Hoxha was born on 16 October 1908 in Gjirokastra 
/in Southern Albania/, one of the most beautiful small towns 
in, Albania. At that time Albania belonged to the Turkish 
empire and became independent only four years later, in 1912. 
The Turkish domination lasting for five centuries turned 
Albania into the "darkest Europe", citing the words of the 
outstanding.Hungarian balkanologist at the turn of the century, 
Ferenc Nopcsa. Backward tribal conditons, religious obscurity, 
extreme poverty, backwardness and oppression of the masses, 
limitless despotism, corruptness and nationalist arrogance of 
the ruling circles - i.e. all that is called "Balkan condi-
tions" - were more characteristic of Albania, a state established 
at the beginning of the 20th century, than of any other country 
of the peninsula. The most prominent representatives of the 
Albanian people struggled exactly against this extreme back-
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wardness. 
The father of Enver Hoxha was a wealthy Moslem tradesman. 
/The meaning of the Turkish word "hoxha" is Moslem priest./ 
Enver Hoxha was given a careful aducation. He completed 
his high-school studies in Albania's most famous institution 
of this k i n d, the French high-school in Korcha. Since he was 
an eminent student, he was given the possibility to continue 
his studies with scholarship from the state in France in 1931. 
He attended the Montpellier Technical College but before long 
the revolutionary activity became more, important for him. He 
entered the French Communist Party and published articles 
critical of the Zogu-regime in l'Humanité. For this reason 
the Albanian government interrupted the payment of his 
scholarship.In Paris he met sevpral Albanian professionals 
who were opponents of the Zogu-regime. In 1936 he worked 
as the private secretary of the Albanian consul in Brussels 
but soon he was fired. 
In 19^6 he returned home and started to work as a French 
teacher in the high-school of Korcha. After a short while 
he joined in the work of the local communist group. 
After the Italians had occupied A'lbania in April 1939 , 
he was sent by the Korcha Communist Group to Tirana where, 
under the cover of a tobacco shop, he was working for the 
establishment of the Albanian Communist Party and the or-
ganization of the struggle against the occupants. 
It was partly his merit that the three largest communist 
groups - of Korcha, Shkodra and Tirana -, which had been 
competing with each other before, established the Albanian 
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Communist Party on 8 November 1941. Then he was elected 
only to be the interim leader of the party. His election 
was the result of a compromise because the three groups 
did not want to elect any of the three group leaders. 
During the one year and a half following his election he 
showed excellent organizing capabilities: under his leader-
ship the position of the party was stabilized and it reach-
ed great successes in the fight against the fascist occu-
pants and their Albanian proxies. The 33-years old leader 
distinguished himself among his companions not only with 
his tall figure and sonorous voice but also with his well-
stored mind and his ability to work out compromises. This 
was appreciated by the first conference of the Albanian 
Communist Party in March 1943, on which he was elected the 
General Secretary of the party. 
Enver Hoxha played a great role in organizing the dis-
persed guerilla groups into a unified liberation army. In 
1943 he obtained the post of political komissar and in 1944 
he became the commander-in-chief of this army. 
In May 1944 he was elected the Chairman of the Executive 
Comittee of the Antifascist National Liberation Council 
of Albania, and in October he was elected the Premier .of 
the first, interim government which replaced the above or-
gan. On 28 November 1944, the eve of Albania's complete 
liberation, Hoxha, as a recognized leader of the party, 
the government and the armed forces, expounded the popu-
lar democratic government's program for the construction 
of a new, socialist Albania. 
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However, the removal of the antidogmatic Sejfulla Males-
hova and several followers in 1946 had already signed the 
victory.of the sectarian and dogmatic lin within thet Albanian 
communist movement. This dogmatism was partly consequent upon 
the condition of the international communist movement of the 
time but it also had very strong internal sources: the 
dominance of the backward peasant masses in the country and • 
in the party, the small size and short history of the working 
class,\its low level of class-consciousness and its petty 
buorgeois attitude, the weak theoretical grounding of the 
party leadership and the influence of nationalist ideas. 
These internal factors had a decisive role in the fact that 
dogmatism remained dominant in Albania even after the death 
of Stalin, when its harmful effests were more and more over-
come in the.international movement of workers. 
The Yugoslav communists had a significant role in the 
establishment and structural reinforcement of the Albanian 
Communist Party. The Yugoslav state and party machinery 
and the Yugoslav army served as models for the creation 
of similar Albanian organs. The.liberation war, which they 
fought independently but supporting each other, and the 
manysided assistance of Yugoslavia after the war streng-
thened the pro-Yugoslav feelings in Albania and also those 
tendencies which were directed toward an Albanian7Yugoslav 
confederation. There also existed an opposite tendency of 
anti-Yugoslav feelings resulting from the traditional hos-
tility between Albanians and the Serbs, and it was streng-
thened by the failure of the attempts to find a solution 
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to the Kosovo problem, which would be satisfying for both 
countries. 
Two groups emerged within the ACP leadership, in accor-
dance with the above contrasting tendencies: a pro-Yugoslav, 
internationalist, federalist group and an anti-Yugoslav, na-
tionalist group which adhered to Albania's independence and 
did not give up the aim of obtaining Kosovo. Between 1941 
and 1948 the two groups were struggling with each other 
with alternating results, but most, of the skirmishes ended 
in the victory of the pro-Yugoslav wing headed by Kochi Dzodze. 
The excellent manoevring capabilities of Enver Hoxha revealed 
themselves in this period: although he was the leader of the 
anti-Yugoslav faction, he did not pledge himself definitely 
to it; when it was necessary, he withdrew and exercised self-
-criticism, and although he was defeated several times, he 
always succeeded in retaining the leadership of the party for 
himself. 
In the summer of 1948, armed with the well-known anti-
Yugoslav decision of the Information Bureau and with the 
support of the Soviet Union, he gained a decisive victory over, 
the pro-Yugoslav wing and he was not so tolerant to his 
defeated adversaries as they had earlier been to him seve-
ral times. 
In November 1948, on the first congress of the Albanian 
communists, the name of the party was changed into "Party 
of Labour of Albania". On this congress Enver Hocha spoke 
triumphantly of the victories over the internal and ex-
ternal enemies and determined the most important tasks 
of the construction of socialism. These were: industrial!-
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zatlon and electrification of the country, socialist re-
organization of the agriculture and cultural revolution. 
Between 1949 and 1961 close cooperation with the Soviet 
Union and the Soviet Communist Party was' the decisive 
factor of Albania's political, economic and cultural life. 
The mechanic imitation of the Soviet methods under cir-
cumstances significantly different from the Soviet ones 
caused similar problems as in the other socialist count-
ries. The strained development of the industry, above all 
of its sector "A" /roughly the heavy industry/, the forced 
collectivization of the agriculture, the repressive mea-
sures taken against the middle class, even the low-middle 
class and against all kinds of dissidents, the pullulation 
of the bureaucracy and the "cult of the personality" caused 
distortions in the construction of socialism that were 
compensated only partially by the numerous successes in 
the material production and in the improvement of the 
cultural level and the sanitary conditions of the masses. 
The Albanian leadership tried to overcome the insuffi-
ciency of the material and financial resources, the 
shortage in trained speicialists and other difficulties 
with the help of the COMECON countries. Albania practi-
cally blackmailed the Soviet Union and the other socialist 
countries with its poverty and relatively modest demands, 
and with its "status" of the smallest and less developed 
European socialist country. At last Albania obtained the 
help it had claimed but then another difficulty emerged: 
it often could not adequately use the help it had been 
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given because its forces of production were so poorly 
developed. 
However, it is an undeniable fact that the construction 
of socialism in a backward and semifeudal country like Alba-
nia was only possible through the large-scale assistance 
of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It 
was especially important for Albania to join the organization 
of economic and'/later/ politico-military cooperation of the 
European socialist countries. This made possible its breaking 
through the international isolation of the country and relying 
on the experience and help of the more advenced socialist 
countries in a more effective and more, organized form than 
earlier. 
At the same time it is also undeniable that the helpers, 
while offering generous internationalist assistance, did 
not always and in the same degree consider the specific 
features of the Albanian circumstances and respect the 
"small-nat'ion pride" of the Albanian people and leaders. 
The socialist countries were sending a great number of 
experts who did not always understand the specialities of 
the Albanian situation. All these contributed to the in-
tensification of the Albanians' traditional xenophobia. 
The Albanian leaders were able to take advantage nf this 
situation when they decided to break off relations with 
their allies /first with Yugoslavia, later with the Soviet 
Union and finally with China/. 
The close Soviet-Albanian relations were on the highest 
level demonstrated by the meetings of Enver Hoxha with 
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Stalin between 1947 and 1952. He gave a detailed account 
of these summits in his memoirs published- in 1979. 
This was the formation period of the "personality cult" 
around Enver Hoxha, which was the Albanian version of the 
Stalinist "personality cult" and the similar•phenomenon 
in the other people's democracies. As a consequence of 
the victory in the liberation war and the successes achieved 
in the county's recovery, delusions started to circulate 
and spread about his infallibility and omnipotence. Hoxha 
himself also had a share in their propagation. 
After Stalin's death the "personality cult" around Enver 
Hoxha was also restrained for a short time: in 1954 he gave 
up some of his posts and in 1956, on the third congress of 
the Albanian Labour Party, he had to criticize himself the 
symptoms of the "personality cult", which also took root 
in Albania. But after the repudiation of the reform ideas 
of the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the 
system of the "personality cult" around Enver Hoxha unlimi-
tedly prevailed again. 
After Stalin's death a struggle started also within 
the leadership of the Albanian Labour Party concerning the 
line to be followed. There were two main tendencies: the 
faction headed by Enver Hoxha supported the maintenance 
of the previous methods and concepts while the other fac-
tion demanded a reform of the party. At first Enver Hoxha 
and his followers tried to accomodate themselves to the 
changes following Stalin's death, but the events of the 
party congress in Tirana in 1956 showed that the reform 
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spirit of the 20th congress jeopardizes their power positions. 
Therefore they pursned a manoeuvring policy between 1956 and 
1960: they seemingly accepted the new ideas and expressed 
their everlasting loyalty to the Soviet leaders, but at the 
same time they relentlessly liquidated all pro-reform ideas 
and their representatives. /Among the victims of this showdown 
were some outstanding combatants of the party like Bedri Spahiu, 
Tuk Jakova, Kocho Tashko, Liri Gega and Liri Belishova./ 
The lesson of the Hungarian counter-revolution for the 
Albanian leaders was that it was necessary to suppress all 
ideas different from the official one. 
. In the early sixties a new period started both in Al-
bania's domestic and foreign policy. On the third congress 
ot the Albanian Labour Party in the spring of 1961, Enver 
Hoxha could point out with justified pride that the founda-
tions of socialism came into existence in a historically 
short period and the question of "who defeats whom" had been 
settled, and all these made the accelerated construction 
of the material and technical basis of socialism possible. 
As far as foreign policy is concerned, Enver Hoxha stressed 
yet the enormous services of.the Soviet Union and the Soviet 
Communist Party in the successes of the Albanian people, 
but behind the scenes it.became more and more obvious that 
the Albanian leaders defied the new line elaborated by the 
20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party and stood up 
against the majority of the international communist, movement 
which had adopted this new line. 
Enver Hoxha expressed his opposition to the new line and 
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his approval of the Chinese Communist Party's line for the 
first time.behind close doors on the conference of commu-
nist and workers' parties in November 1960. Following this 
the Albanian leadership broke off all kinds of political, 
economic' and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 
from 1961 on, and it is reluctant to renew them even today. 
At the same time the struggle against the "Khrushchevtype 
revisionism" became one of the ideological pillars of the 
regijne. /A dogmatic, strongly biased and subjective narra-
tion of Albania's cooperation and breaking-off with the 
Soviet Union can be found in the selected documents 
"The. struggle of the Albanian Labour Party against modern 
revisionism" by Enver Hoxha and in his memoirs under the 
title "Khrushchevists"./ 
The ultra-revolutionary, petty bourgeois, radical ide-
ology of maoism was much closer to the Ottoman-feudal tra-
ditions of Albania than to any other country. This fact 
together with the alliance against the common enemy, "the 
Khrush-chev-type revisionism", promoted the spread of maoist 
views in Albania. The main cohesive force of cooperation 
between Albania and China was the concord of the leaders 
of the two countries against the reform ideas of the 20th 
Congress and in the dogmatic interpretation of Marxism-
Leninism. 
After the break-off with the Soviet Union and'its 
allies,, the economic and political support of China became 
vital for Albania. At the same time Albania and the Albanian 
Labour Party became important for the Chinese leadership 
' '-".' •:i./cYi:.."> 
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for two reasons: on the one hand as the only ally in power 
in the struggle against the Soviet Union and the majority 
of the international communist movement /according to Mao 
Tse-tung Albania was "the pharos of socialism in Europe"; 
on the other hand as an outpost of the- diffusion of the 
maoist ideas and as an experimental field for their reali-
zation. Therefore Albania proved to be a favourable partner 
with relatively low costs for the Chinese leadership. 
However, their cooperation was hampered by the large 
geographical distance and difference in size between the 
two countries, by their very different historical, political 
and cultural traditions and in many respects by their dif-
ferent international interests. 
The intimacy of their cooperation and its limits were 
equally revealed by the reception of the Chinese "cultural 
revolution" in Tirana. The two-volumed political diary of 
Enver Hoxha /"Notes on China"/, which was published after 
Albania had broken off with China, indicates that the Al-
banian leader was watching the power struggle in Peking 
sceptically and anxiously from first to last but publically 
he welcomed it enthusiastically as an internationally valid 
example of "how to liquidate modern revisionism". Between 
1966 and 1969 Enver Hocha - partly guided by his own extreme 
left dispositions, partly as an expression of solidarity 
with his Chinese ally - also initiated a "mini cultural 
revolution" in his country. Under the slogan "revolution-
izing the party and the country's life further" a series 
of campaigns took place also in Albania. The Albanian 
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party leader - contrary to the Chinese example - kept a 
firm hand on the events all the time. 
In the early seventies he came into collision with the 
opponents of his dogmatic policy again. The clash was going 
on at several fronts: the military opposition was led by 
Defence Minister Beqir Balluku, member of the politburo, the 
economic one by Deputy Prime Minister Abdyl Kellezi, member 
of.the politburo, and the cultural one by Fadil Pacrami, 
member of the Central Committee, renowned writer. The fight 
ended .up again with the complete victory of Enver Hoxha and 
his followers: in the "struggle against bureaucracy and li-
beralism" the "enemies of the people" were unmasked and re-
moved, thousands of their followers were sent to the provinces 
or imprisoned. /Concerning the fate of the leaders of the 
opposition enver Hoxha only disclosed that "they fell in the 
garbage heap of history"./ 
After Nixon's 1972 visit to Peking, increasing disorders 
could be observed in the Albano-Chinese relations. The Al-
banian leaders were not capable of following the changes 
of the internal power struggles in China and were even 
less able to follow the Chinese leadership's quick opening 
toward the United States, the NATO and the EEC, and its 
"pragmatist" relations with several rightist regimes. 
After appearing on the international scene, China needed 
less and less her small Albanian ally whose consistent dog-
m a t i s m became an increasiug burden for her. 
The gradual decrease of China's political interest and 
economic help induced Enver Hoxha - at first, through con-
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fident channels, later more and more openly - to try to 
bring the Chinese leaders to respect Albania's standpoints 
and interests to a greater extent. After these attempts 
r 
had failed, he decided to make their disagreements public, 
shifting the responsibility for the deterioration of the 
relations between the two parties and countries upon the 
new Chinese leadership. Enver Hoxha's ambitions to take 
over the direction of the so-called "true marxist-leninist 
movement" might have had a role in this step. 
The breaking-off with China in 1978 was another turning 
point in Albania's history: it came into antagonism even 
with its last "great ally" and thus was left alone in the 
surrounding "imperialist-revisionist" vorld. Recognizing 
• • • . i 
this, the Albanian leadership carried out a very cautious 
"opening" in the Albanian foreign and economic policy. 
This does not mean a basic change but indicates the ana-
chronism and intolerability - on the long run t of the 
self-isolationist policy. The opening has been enforced 
above all by the economic needs. As a consequence of the 
interruption of the Chinese assistance, the Albanian eco-
nomy got ont of the preceding "greenhouse circumstances" 
and has been exposed to the world economy. Therefore it 
seems necessary to pursue a more open foreign economic po-
licy which connects the country with the international 
division of labour to a,greater extent in order to be able 
to maintain the country's present economic level. 
Although Enver Hoxha and Mehmet She.hu spoke of the 
"monolithic unity" of the party and the people on the 8th 
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party congress in November 1981, another showdown took place 
less than a month and a half later, this time with Enver 
Hoxha's most faithful ally for four decades. After Mehmet 
Shehu's mysterious "suicide" and the declaration of his being 
a traitor, Enver Hoxha was left as the last of those leaders 
who had shaped the Albanian Labour Party. 
Enver Hoxha's activity is unique also in the sense that 
his writings amount to eighty volumes. He was especially 
voluminous in the las seven years of his life: he wrote 
down his memoirs in seven volumes and the credo of his 
dogmatic views in four volumes. The published oeuvre -
reflecting the great turns in the author's life - under-
went a constant metamorphosis: the passages praising the 
disowned fellow combatants and international allies were 
taken out and replaced by opposite interpretations. 
In October 1983, on his 75th birthday, Enver Hoxha 
presented himself and his "followers with the following 
statement: "We say that we are the only country building 
socialism and we prove it. We have built everything by 
ourselves, by the sweat of our brow and the strength of our 
daughters and sons ..." 
This double statement is a concentrated expression of 
the false reflection of the conditions of his country and the 
outside world in his mind. Albania can only be regarded as 
the sole country building socialism on the basis of very 
dogmatic criteria and it achieved its successes - besides 
its own efforts - with the generous assistance of the other 
socialist countries. 
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The rational core of this irrational statement lies with the 
fact that the Albanian people - led by Enver Hoxha - have 
in fact achieved considerable successes during the trans-
formations of the society in the last four decades. Referring 
only to the most important ones: the industrial production 
has grown by 1.55 times, the agricultural production by 5.5 
times. Insecurity of living, misery and unemployment have 
ceased to exist, education and medical services were made 
free and the living standard is constantly growing even if 
only to a modest extent. 
At the same time the breaking-off with the socialist 
countries and the adherence to the dogmatic interpretation of 
Marxism-Leninism have caused serious problems in every field 
of social and economic life and have slowed down the pace 
of development. It also shows that Albania needs cooperation 
with the socialist countries, which have already expressed 
their readiness to restore and develop relations several 
times. We hope that the new Albanian leadership will sooner 
or later accept thealive branch offered to it. 
The settlement of relations between Albania and the 
socialist countries would make it for the small Balkan 
country possible to share again in the advantages of the 
socialist international division of labour and its iso-
lation could also be c e a s e d . This Would strengthen the 
unity of the socialist commonwealth and improve its stra-
tegic situation on the Balkans and in the Mediterranean 
area. 
Its true friends wish this new turning point to the 
socialist Albania. 
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Ramiz Alia, Hoxha's successor in his speech on August 
26, 1985 emphasised: "Our policy towards our neighbours, as 
toward all the other states, is a consistent, principled 
policy. Those who dream about and expect changes in our line, 
who interpret the normal political and diplomatic activity 
of our independent and sovereign state as the "opening up" 
of Albania, as a "tendency" to rapprochement with one side 
or the other, do so in vain. Albania neither "opens up" nor 
"closes up" ... 
Hower an "opening up" in the Albanian policy, later 
or soon, seems inevitable. 
NB! The official translation of the party's name: the Party 
of Labour of Albania. 
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